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EIGHT YEARS AFTER S. E. U.A.-PRESENT
STATUS OF THE REGULATION OF
INSURANCE AS COMMERCE*
HERBERT

H.

NAuJoKs**

ANALYSIS OF THE S.E.U.A. DECISION
On June 5, 1944, the United States Supreme Court handed down its
earth-shaking decision in the case of United States v. South Eastern
Underwriters Association." This case involved a criminal prosecution
brought in the District Court of the United States for the Northern
District of Georgia against an association of fire insurance companies
operating in Georgia and surrounding states, and against 27' of its
officers and 198 of its member companies. It was charged that a conspiracy existed to fix and maintain arbitrary and non-competitive rates
and to monopolize trade and commerce in violation of the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. A demurrer to the indictment was sustained by the
U.S. District Court in August, 1943. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the District Court by a 4 to 3 decision (Justices
Roberts and Reed having disqualified themselves). The high court thus
sustained the indictment on the ground that the defendants were
engaged in interstate commerce and, therefore, subject to the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act. An opinion written by Mr. Justice Black (Justices
Murphy, Douglas and Rutledge concurring), distinguished a long line
of cases beginning with Paul v. Virginia2 which held that insurance was
A.

* This article is a sequel to an article by the writer entitled Regulation of the

Business of Insurance and Public Law No. 15, 79th Congress, First Session,
which appeared in 30 MARQ. L. REv. 77 (1946).
**B.A., M.A., and LL.B., University of Wisconsin; S.J.D., Yale University;
Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin (1927-1936) ; member of the Illinois
State Bar Association Executive Committee, Section on Insurance; member
of the Illinois bar.
'322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944).
2 8 Wall. 168, 19 L.Ed. 357 (1869). In this case the court said that a Virginia
statute which regulated foreign insurance companies did not offend the commerce clause because "issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of
commerce." 8 Wall. 168, 183. In subsequent similar cases this statement has
been repeated and, in some cases broadened: Ducat v. Chicago, 10 Wall. 410,
415, 19 L.Ed. 972 (1871); Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 10 Wall. 566,
573, 19 LEd. 1029 (1871); Philadelphia Fire Assn. v. New York, 119 U.S.
110, 118, 7 S.Ct. 108, 30 L.Ed. 342 (1886) ; Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648,
654, 15 S.Ct. 207, 39 L.Ed. 297 (1895) ; Noble v. Mitchell, 164 U.S. 367, 370,
17 S.Ct. 110, 41 L.Ed. 472 (1896); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178
U.S. 389, 401, 20 S.Ct. 962, 44 L.Ed. 1116 (1900) ; Nutting v. Massachusetts,
183 U.S. 553, 22 S.Ct. 238 46, L.Ed. 324 (1902) ; New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Dodge, 231 U.S. 495, 503, 504, 510, 34 S.Ct. 167, 58 L.Ed. 332 (1913) ; Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 247 U.S. 132, 38 S.Ct. 444, 62
L.Ed. 1025 (1918); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71,
75, 43 S.Ct. 32, 67 L.Ed. 136 (1922); Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275
U.S. 274, 276-277, 48 S.Ct. 124, 72 L.Ed. 277 (1927) ; and Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404, 432, 56 S.Ct. 252, 80 L.Ed. 299 (1935).
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not commerce. The Court pointed out that the earlier cases involved
only the validity of state statutes and that this was the first case which
squarely presented the question whether the Commerce Clause grants
to Congress the power to regulate insurance when conducted across
state lines. Chief Justice Stone filed a vigorous dissenting opinion in
which Justice Frankfurter concurred. Justice Jackson filed a separate
dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Stone pointed out that "Nothing in its
(Sherman Act) legislative history suggests that it was to apply to the
business of insurance. ' 3 The Chief Justice further questioned the
decision of the Court "in now overturning the precedents of seventy-five
years governing a business of such volume and of such wide ramifications," and he commented that the decision "cannot fail to be the
occasion for loosening a flood of litigation and of legislation, state and
national, in order to establish a new boundary between state and national
power, raising questions which cannot be answered for years to come,
during which a great business and the regulatory officers of every state
must be harassed by all the doubts and difficulties inseparable from
'
a realignment of the distribution of power in our federal system.'
Justice Jackson, in his dissenting opinion, also pointed with alarm
to the fact that: "The Court's decision at very least will require an
extensive overhauling of state legislation relating to taxation and
supervision. The whole legal basis will have to be reconsidered. What
will be irretrievably lost and what may be salvaged no one can now say,
and it will take a generation of litigation to determine. Certainly, the
states lose very important controls and very considerable revenues."5
Eight years have passed since the decision in the South Eastern
Underwriters case-eight years of insurance as commerce. It is time
to examine again the record to see whether any or all of the dire
predictions made as to the effect of the S.E.U.A. decision on the
insurance industry have come true.
B. MAJOR COURT DECISIONS SINCE THE
SOUTH EASTERN UNDERWRITERS DECISION
While the South Eastern Underwriters'decision inevitably produced
some litigation in order to clarify the confused situation which resulted
from the Court's holding that insurance is commerce, one could not
truthfully say that a "flood of litigation" has been loosed as a result of
that decision during the last eight years.
Almost two years to the day passed before the United States
6
Supreme Court handed down any decisions directly involving questions
arising under the South Eastern Underwriterscase.
3 Supra, note 1, 322 U.S. at p. 574.
gSupra,
note 1, 322 U.S. at p. 583.
SSupra, note 1, 322 U.S. at p. 590.
6The decision in the case of Polish National Alliance v. National Labor Relaticns Board, 322 U.S. 643, 64 S.Ct. 1196, 88 L.Ed. 1509 (1944), was handed
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On June 3, 1946, the Court decided two cases affirming the power
of the states to regulate or tax insurance companies. In the case of
PrudentialInsurance Company v.Benjamin7 it was held that the State
of South Carolina had power to impose a three percent premium tax on
a foreign life insurance company even though the tax imposed under
the South Carolina statute applied only to foreign insurance companies
and not to domestic insurance companies. This case involved Public
Law 158 which declares that the continued regulation and taxation by
the several states of the business of insurance is in the public interest
and that such business shall be subject to the laws of the several states
which relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. The Court
declared Public Law 15 valid as involving no unconstitutional delegation
of power by Congress and as violating no constitutional provisions.
The second case, decided on June 3, 1946, was the case of Robertson
v. California which upheld a conviction of the defendant-appellant of
having violated a California statute requiring the licensing of insurance
agents, and making it a misdemeanor to act as agent for a nonadmitted
insurance company. In this case the Court, without regard to Public
Law 15 (the McCarran Act), upheld the state power to regulate the
business of insurance. Justice Rutledge wrote the opinion of the Court
and Justice Douglas dissented in part. The Court stated that "to avoid
any semblance of retroactive effect in a criminal matter, we have refrained from explicit reliance upon the (McCarran) Act in this case.
It does detract from our decision on other grounds that the McCarran
Act, if applied, would dictate the same result."' 0
down on the same day, June 5, 1944, when the Court decided the South

Eastern Underwriters case, supra, note 1. The Polish Alliance case held that
a fraternal benefit society was subject to the National Labor Relations Act
because the Polish National Alliance was an insurance company and that
its operations "affect" commerce within the meaning of the Act. Justice
Frankfruter wrote the opinion and there were no dissents therefrom.
'328 U.S. 408, 66 S.Ct. 1142, 90 L.Ed. 1342, 164 A.L.R. 476 (1946). Note:
State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 154, 65 S.Ct. 573,
89 L.Ed. 812 (1945) was not decided under S.E.U.A. or Public Law 15. In
this case the United States Supreme Court on Feb. 12, 1945, upheld, under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, a Wisconsin statute
requiring, as interpreted by the Wisconsin insurance commissioner, premium
reserves on out of state membership fees. The high Court upheld the judgment of the Wisconsin Supreme Court without deciding the question whether
the Wisconsin statute as applied was in violation of the commerce clause
inasmuch as this question was not raised in the lower court but was first
raised in the U.S. Supreme Court, since it emerged only after the appeal was
filed on June 1, 1944. The U.S. Supreme Court decided the Southeastern
Underwriters case, supra, note 1, holding that insurance is commerce, on
June 5, 1944. The high Court concluded that the company would not be
prejudiced since it could raise the commerce question in the Wisconsin courts,
either in the present case or in other pending cases.
859 STAT. 34, 15 U.S.C.A. 1011-1015, Public Law 15, also known as the
McCarran Act, was adopted March 9, 1945.
09328 U.S. 440, 66 S.Ct. 1160, 90 L.Ed. 1366 (1946).
Ibid., 328 U.S. at p. 462.
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One week after the decisions in the Prudential and the Robertson
cases, on June 10, 1946, the United States Supreme Court upheld"1 a
decision of the Kansas Supreme Court1

2

in In re Insurance Tax Cases,

sustaining the regular Kansas premium tax similar to the South Carolina
premium tax. The United States Supreme Court in the cases of
American Indemnity Co. v. Hobbs,13 and Pacific Mutual Life v.
4
affirmed the validity of the Kansas premium tax imposed under
Hobbs,1
the provisions of the Kansas retaliatory law.' 5 The per curiam opinion
of the United States Supreme Court filed in all four of the above cases
merely cited the cases of Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, and
Robertson v. Californiato affirm the judgment of the lower court.'8
In PrudentialIns. Co. v. Indiana17 the United States Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Indiana Supreme Court holding valid the
Indiana insurance premium tax law"" imposing a tax on premiums
collected by foreign insurance companies in Indiana as not constituting a
burden upon or discriminating against interstate commerce, especially in
view of Public Law 15 stating the taxation of the interstate business of
insurance shall continue by the states. The United States Supreme
Court cited its decision in the PrudentialIns. Co. v. Benjamin case in
affirming the lower court.
In PrudentialIns. Co. v. Barnett9 the Mississippi Supreme Court
ruled that in view of Public Law 15 the Mississippi insurance premium
tax of 24 per cent imposed on foreign insurance companies was valid,
notwithstanding that local companies are required to pay but one-half of
that amount against which their ad valorem tax may be credited.
In Keehn v. Brady Transfer & Storage Co. 20 a lower federal court
held that the requirement of the Iowa Code of 193921 that a company
issuing insurance other than life insurance disclose its financial condition
is valid until Congress occupies the field by the passage of an insurance
regulatory law, since the Iowa statute involved is non-discriminatory,
being applied on home and foreign insurance companies alike, and is
not a burden on interstate commerce.
"Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 328 U.S. 822, 66 S.Ct. 1358, 90 L.Ed. 1602 (1945);
Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hobbs, 328 U.S. 823, 66 S.Ct. 1363, 90 L.Ed. 1603 (1946).
12 In re Insurance Tax Cases, 160 Kan. 300, 161 P. (2d) 726 (1945).
- 328 U.S. 822, 66 S.Ct. 1358, 90 L.Ed. 1602 (1946).
24 Ibid.

158 Supra, note 12.
' Supra, notes 11, 13 and 14.
'2 328 U.S. 823, 66 S.Ct. 1363, 90 L.Ed. 1603 (1946). Lower court decision is
found in 224 Ind. 17, 64 N.E. (2d) 150 (1945).
i8 BuRN's ANNOTATED INDIANA STATS., §39-4802.
'9200 Miss. 233, 27 S.(2d) 60 (1946).
20 64 F. Supp. 392 (D.C. N.D. Ill., 1946), reversed on other grounds, 159 F. (2d)
2 1 383 (7th Cir., 1947).
IowA REv. STATS. (1939), § 8945.
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In Mendola v. Dineen22 the New York Court held that the provisions
of the New York Statute23 relating to the licensing and regulation of
both domestic and foreign insurance companies doing business in the
State of New York and of insurance agents, brokers and adjusters, are
reasonable regulatory and protective measures, constituting proper
exercise of the state's police power, and hence are not invalid as
24
violating the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution,
especially in view of Public Law 15 (the McCarran Act) expressing
Congress' intention to leave to the states the regulation of foreign
insurance companies doing business therein.
&2 5
In Traveler's Health Ass'n. v. Virginia
the Traveler's Health
Association of Nebraska attacked the validity of the provisions of the
Virginia Blue Sky Law which requires persons selling or offering for
sale securities, including insurance certificates, in the State of Virginia
to obtain a permit from the State Corporation Commission, and also
that such individual must agree that suits can be filed against him by
service of process on the Secretary of State. Punishment may be by
criminal action or by a "cease and desist order." The section also provides for service by registered mail where other types of service are
unavailable "because the offering is by advertisement and/or solicitations
through periodicals, mail, telephone, telegraph, radio, or other means of
communications beyond the limits of the state."
The Traveler's Association was not licensed in Virginia and conducted its business by mail. New members were secured from persons
recommended by present members in Virginia who submitted names to
the home office in Nebraska. Applications were then mailed prospects
who mailed the completed application with premium to the Company
and in due time received their policies. About 800 members were in
Virginia.
The Commission served the Company with process by registered
mail and proceeded under the law to issue a "cease and desist" order.
The Company appeared "specially" to protest the jurisdiction of the
state. The Virginia courts upheld the statute and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed.
This decision undoubtedly ends the day of uncontrolled mail order
insurance. The states will, in all likelihood, in the near future impose
strict regulations on mail order insurance and may even require all
insurers to be licensed in each state in which the insurer solicits
insurance.
22185 Misc. 540, 57 N.Y.S. (2d) 219 (1945).
23 McKINNEy's N.Y. INSURANCE LAW, §§ 40,
24 U.S. CONsT., Art. 1., Sec. 8, C1. 3.
25

42, 110 et seq.

339 U.S. 643, 70 S.Ct. 927, 94 L.Ed. 1154 (1950), affirming 188 Va. 879, 51 S.E.
(2d) 263 (1949).
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In North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Reciprocal
6
Exchange,"
the United States Supreme Court denied a petition for a
writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals. This
action had the effect of upholding the validity of the Arkansas "AllIndustry type" of casualty rating law which provides for a state automobile risk plan, under which each auto insurer accepts an equitable
number of risks from applicants unable to obtain insurance elsewhere.
The decisions of the United States District Court and the United States
Court of Appeals sustained the legality of the state insurance law in
question and of Public Law 15. In this case the Transportation
Company had sued the Casualty Reciprocal Exchange and others to
recover treble damages under the Federal Anti-Trust Acts and to enjoin
the fixing of automobile liability insurance rates. The Company had
challenged the validity of Public Law 15 and Act 116 of the Acts of
Arkansas, 1947, pursuant to which the Casualty Reciprocal Exchange
had fixed the casualty insurance rates complained of. The United
States Court of Appeal cited the PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Benjamin
case, and the Robertson v. California case, among others, in support of
its decision upholding the federal and state acts involved.
The Federal District Court, in the North Little Rock case, in
discussing the application of the Federal statutes to the business of
insurance, said in part :27
"1. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1, applies to transactions
of insurance. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters
Association, 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440.
"2. Public Law 15, Mar. 9, 1945, Chap. 20, Sec. 1 et seq.,
59 Stat. 34, July 25, 1947, C. 326, 61 Stat. 448, Title 15, U.S.C.A.
§1011, et seq., known as the McCarran-Ferguson Act is constitutional. Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin, Insurance
Commissioner, 328 U.S. 408, 66 S.Ct. 1142, 90 L.Ed. 1342, 164
A.L.R. 476.
"3. In the absence of public regulation or Congressional
exemption, the price fixing activities of the Bureau involved in
this case would constitute a violation of the Sherman Act.
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S.Ct.
746, 84 L.Ed. 1104, rehearing denied, Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v.
United States, 310 U.S. 658, 60 S.Ct. 1091, 84 L.Ed. 1421.
"4. The Sherman Act is not violated by acts authorized and
regulated by state statute. Parker, Director of Agriculture, et al.
v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315. There the
court said: 'We find nothing in the language of the Sherman Act
or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to restrain a
state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its
legislature.' (p. 351) Also Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin,
340 U.S. 823, 71 S.Ct. 56, 95 L.Ed. 604 (1950). Lower court decisions in 85
F.Supp. 961 (D.C.W.D.Ark., 1949) and 181 F. (2d) 174 (8th Cir., 1950).
27 Ibid., 85 F.Supp. at p. 964.
26
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etc., supra. This also is expressly provided by the McCarranFerguson Act, which exempts insurance from the Sherman Act
'to the extent that such business is regulated by state law.'
Act 116 of Arkansas, 1947, constitutes proper regulation within
the meaning of that statute.
"5. The McCarran-Ferguson Act is not a delegation 'to
individual States power to legislate in the regulation of insurance
transactions coming within the Commerce Clause,' but is a
division of power between the United States and the several
States, a rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's.
Connecticut Light & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission,
324 U.S. 515, 65 S.Ct. 749, 89 L.Ed. 1150. In this case the
court found that the congressional action in extending federal
jurisdiction to only 'those matters which are not subject to
regulation by the States ***' constituted a legal standard that
must be given effect in resolving conflicting claims by federal
and state authorities of power to regulate. (p. 531) Also
Prudential Insurance Company v. Benjamin, etc., supra."
In the recent decision in California State Automobile Ass'n. v.
Maloney2 8 the United States Supreme Court sustained the validity of
the California Compulsory Assigned Risk Law 29 against attacks based

on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case,
the Court, through Mr. Justice Douglas, said:
"The case in its broadest reach is one in which the state
requires in the public interest each member of a business to
assume a pro rata share of a burden which modern conditions
have made incident to the business. It is therefore not unlike
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 55 L.Ed. 112,
31 S.Ct. 186, 32 L.R.A. NS 1062, Ann. Cas. 1912A 487, which
sustained a state law assessing each state bank for the creation of
a depositor's guaranty fund. What was there said about the
police power-that it 'extends to all the great public needs' and
may be utilized in aid of what the legislative judgment deems
necessary to the public welfare (p. 111)-is peculiarly apt when
the business of insurance is involved-a business to which the
government has long had a 'special relation.' See Osborn v.
Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 65, 66, 84 L.Ed. 1074, 1079, 1080, 60 S.Ct.
758. Here, as in the banking field, the power of the state is broad
enough to take over the whole business, leaving no part for
private enterprise. Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243
U.S. 219, 61 L.Ed. 685, 37 S.Ct. 260, Ann. Cas. 1917D 642,
13 NCCA 927; Osborn v. Ozlin, supra. The state may therefore
hold its hand on conditions that local needs be serviced by
the business. Osborn v. Ozlin, supra, was such a case; it
sustained on that theory Virginia's law requiring Virginia residents to have a share in writing casualty and surety risks in
Virginia. The principle of Osborn v. Ozlin now presses for
recognition in a situation as acute as any with which the states
-341 U.S. 105, 109-110, 71 S.Ct. 601,95 L.Ed. 788 (1951).
(1947), ch. 39, as amended, ch. 1205.

29 CAL. STAT.
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have had to deal. Highway accidents with their train of property
and personal injuries are notoriously important problems in
every community. Clearing the highways of irresponsible
drivers, devising ways and means for making sure that compensation is awarded the innocent victims, and yet managing a
scheme which leaves the highways open for the livelihood of
the deserving are problems that have taxed the ingenuity of law
makers and administrators.
"Whether California's program is wise or unwise is not our
concern. See Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236, 85 L.Ed. 1305,
61 S.Ct. 862, 133 A.L.R. 1500; Lincoln Federal Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 93 L.Ed. 212,
69 S.Ct. 251, 260, 267, 6 A.L.R. (2d) 473. The problem is a
local one on which views will vary. We cannot say California
went beyond permissible limits when it made the liability insurance business accept insurable risks which circumstances
barred from insurance and hence from the highways. Appellant's
business may of course be less prosperous as a result of the
regulation. That diminution in value, however, has never
mounted to the dignity of a taking in the constitutional sense.
See Noble State Bank v. Haskell, supra; Block v. Hirsh, 256
U.S. 135, 155, 65 L.Ed. 865, 870, 41 St.Ct. 458, 16 A.L.R. 165.
"Affirmed." (Emphasis ours)
In Darr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.30 it was held that an insurance
company's activities in the development of the contents of its insurance
contracts, the preparation of its policy forms, the entering into of
insurance contracts, the carrying out of such contracts, and the like,
were covered by the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act 3' because "these
insurance policies (contracts) are goods produced for commerce."32
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals decision affirmed the
lower Federal Court's decision that the employees of a life insurance
company who are engaged in the maintenance and operation of the
company's home office buildings in New York City are covered by the
33
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.

In the Darr case, the United States Circuit Court of Appeals said,
in part

:34

"The decisions which we are bound to follow lead us to the
conclusion that the Fair Labor Standards Act does cover these
plaintiffs. In United States v. South Eastern Underwriters'
Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440, it was held
that insurance business conducted across state lines in substantially the way the appellee conducts its business was subject
to regulation by Congress under the Commerce Clause. While
30 74 F. Supp. 80 (D.C. S.D. N.Y., 1947), affd. 169 F. (2d) 262 (2d Cir., 1948),
cert. den. 335 U.S. 871, 69 S.Ct. 166, 93 L.Ed. 415 (1948).
3129
U.S.C.A. §§ 203(j), 206, 207.
32
Supra, note 30, 169 F. (2d) at pp. 264-265.
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-209.
34Supra, note 30, 169 F. (2d) at p. 264.
3
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that, perhaps, is not wholly determinitive of the question whether
insurance policies are "goods" within the meaning of section 3 (i)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. Sec. 203 (i), it
does show that the issuance of such policies may be a part of
interstate commerce and supersedes such decisions as Paul v.
Virginia, 8 Wall. 168, * * * ,,34a
The impact of the S.E.U.A. decision and of Public Law 15 as
regards the regulation and taxation of insurance companies has been
examined and discussed by the courts in other cases of lesser importance, as in Ware v. Travelers Ins. Co. 3 5 where the court upheld the
resident agents statute; in First National Benefit Soc. v. Garrison3 6
wherein the right of the state of California to regulate a foreign insurance company was sustained; in Glass v. PrudentialIns. Co.,3 7 where
the court upheld the validity of the Alabama premium tax as applied to
a foreign insurance company; in Keehn v. Hi-Grade Coal & Fuel Co.,38
where it was held that a New Jersey statute regulating insurance was
not rendered invalid by the S.E.U.A. decision; in Insurance Commissionerof Pennsylvaniav. Grifiths,39 which involved an action to recover
an asessment under a decree of a foreign court; and in Keehn v.
Laubach, et. al.,40 where the court sustained the validity of the requirement that an insurance company disclose its financial condition. All of
these cases involved in the main about the same type of situations that
have arisen from time to time before S.E.U.A. and the courts' rulings
were just about what one would expect under the circumstances in
each case.
The foregoing summary and discussion of the most important
decisions involving insurance regulatory and tax laws since S.E.U.A.
serves to demonstrate that the present thinking of the courts regarding
the powers of the states to regulate and tax the business of insurance is
34a

The decisions discussed hereinbefore are the only cases of prime importance
decided since S.E.U.A. which involve directly the power of the states under
existing Federal laws (and especially under Public Law 15) to oregulate insurance companies doing business in two or more states. There are a number
of other decisions which involve, in general, the regulation of insurance companies. However, in these cases the courts were called upon to consider
merely very general questions of regulation or of statutory construction.
Among some of the more recent decisions of this type are the following:
Klukas v. Yount, 98 N.E. (2d) 227 (Ind. App., 1951); Commissioner v.
O'Leary, 168 Pa. Super, 569, 72 A. (2d) 789 (1951); Indemnity Ins. Co. of
No. Am. v. Rutherford Frt. Lines, 64 S.E. (2d) 668 (Va., 1951); Arkansas
Inspection & Rating Bureau v. Ins. Co. of No. Am., 218 Ark. 830, 238 S.W.
(2d) 929 (1951) ; Bd. of Ins. Commissioners v. Great Southern Life Ins. Co.,
239 S.W. (2d) 803 (Tex., 1951); Employers' Liability Ass'm. Corp. v.
Lejeune, 189 F. (2d) 521 (5th Cir., 1951); Dearborn Nat. Ins. Co. v. Forbes,

329 Mich. 107, 44 N.W. (2d) 892 (1951).
150 F. (2d) 463 (9th Cir., 1945).
3658 F. Supp. 972 (D.C.S.D.Cal., 1945), affd. 155 F. (2d) 522 (9th Cir., 1946).
37246 Ala. 579, 22 S. (2d) 13 (1945).
38 23 N.J. Misc. 102, 41 A. (2d) 525 (1945).
39 23 N.J. Misc. 96, 41 A. (2d) 386 (1945).
4022 N.J. Misc. 380, 39 A. (2d) 73 (1944), appeal dismissed 133 N.J.L. 227, 43
A. (2d) 857 (1945).

35

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

about what it has been before S.E.U.A. The recent decisions involving
the power of the state to regulate or to tax insurance companies make
it crystal clear that the courts will, in general, uphold such power of
the states, at least to the same extent and degree as before the S.E. U.A.
decision. Each case must, of course, be decided on its own facts, but
there is no reason to expect at this time any basic change in the courts'
attitude toward the states' regulation of the business of insurance.
C. FEDERAL LEGISLATION-PUBLIC LAW 15
Even before the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the
S.E.U.A. case in June, 1944, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners had taken a great interest in the criminal action
brought by the Federal Goveinment against the South Eastern Underwriters' Association because of the importance of the legal issues
involved. In November of 1943, a resolution was adopted by the State
Insurance Commissioners at their midyear meeting, which reaffirmed
the historic position of the Commissioners in favor of continued regulation of the business of insurance by the states. After the S.E.U.A.
decision in June, 1944, which held that insurance was commerce and if
conducted across state lines was interstate commerce, the Commissioners
appointed a special committee which took on active part in the formulation of the law which was approved March 9, 1945, and which became
known as the McCarran Act, or Public Law 15.4'

Public Law 15, the only"Federal law of prime importance affecting
the business of insurance since S.E.U.A., was adopted to express the
intention of Congress that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several states of the business of insurance is in the public interest and
that such business is to be subject to the laws of the several states which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business. The McCarran Act
also created a so-called moratorium period. An anti-trust moratorium
was deemed necessary to give the insurance industry enough time in
which to become adjusted to its new status under the Sherman AntiTrust Act and related federal laws. In order to accommodate the
insurance industry and to allow sufficient time for the states to examine
their laws and to overhaul and amend those already on the books where
needed, to rescind some insurance laws and to adopt new laws regulating insurance, if necessary, Congress adopted the McCarran Act
which specifically made the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and related Acts
inapplicable to the business of insurance until January 1, 1948.42 However, the McCarran Act (Public Law 15) provides that even during the
moratorium period, as well as thereafter, the Sherman Act is to remain
§ 1011 et seq.
Law 15, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 et seq. By amendment in 1947 the
moratorium period was extended to June 30, 1948.

4115 U.S.C.A.
42 § 3a, Public
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applicable to boycott, coercion and intimidation. 43 The McCarran Act
provides further that at the end of the moratorium period, the Sherman
Act, Clayton Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act shall be
applicable to the business of insurance "to the extent that such business
is not regulated by state law." 44
Another important part of the McCarran Act is the declaration by
Congress that the continued regulation and taxation of the business of
insurance by the states is in the public interest and that silence on the
part of Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the
regulation or taxation of such business by the states. 45 The Act also
provides that the business of insurance shall be subject to state laws
which regulate and tax it.4 6
D. STATE LEGISLATION
1. IN GENERAL
At the time Public Law 15 was adopted in March, 1945, the amount
and degree of regulation by the states of the business of insurance
differed widely. State regulation varied from strict supervision of all
lines of insurance to little or no regulation. This was due to the fact
that the states differ widely in population as well as economically and
socially. Moreover, insurance regulation is affected by the location of
insurance companies, insurance needs and other factors. Thus, the
problem facing each of the states was to analyze its own laws relating
to the business of insurance to determine whether existing insurance
laws constituted "regulation" within the meaning of Public Law 15
so as to continue state regulation and so as to provide immunity from
the Federal Anti-Trust Acts. Those states which had little or no regulation of the insurance industry naturally wished to pass new insurance
regulatory laws so as to provide the "regulation" demanded by the Act
of March 9, 1945, while other states were interested in adding only such
laws as were needed to supplement the insurance laws then in force, or
perhaps to revamp existing laws in order to provide complete regulation.
The result of seven years of enactment of state laws involving insurance
regulation and taxation has truly produced a "flood .. . of legislation . . ." thus carrying out in part Chief Justice Stone's famous prediction made in{1944 in the S.E.U.A. case.
After the passage of Public Law 15, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners and the All-Industry Committee, representing
all segments of the insurance industry, cooperated to formulate a
tentative program of legislation deemed necessary to regulate effectively
Ibid.,
§2b.
-Ibid., §3b.

43
45

46

Ibid., §1.

Ibid., §2a.
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the insurance industry and thus to carry out the intent of Congress.
Among the important problems facing the Insurance Commissioners and
the All-Industry Committee was the question of the meaning of the
word "regulated" as used in Public Law 15 which provides, in part,
that the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts shall
be applicable to the business of insurance only "to the extent that such
business is not regulated by state law."4? What is the yardstick to be
used in determining whether particular legislation constitutes "regulation" within the meaning of Public Law 15? There are no authoritative
court decisions construing the meaning of the word "regulated" as used
in Public Law 15. In previous decisions involving a multitude of facts
and under varying laws, the Courts generally gave the word "regulate"
a broad and comprehensive definition,-s as meaning to control by rule,
method or established mode, with appropriate regard to the welfare of
those immediately concerned in the matter, as well as the public at
large.
In construing the language of Public Law 15, some eminent authorities believe that the term "regulate" as used therein requires both
positive and effective regulation of all phases of the insurance business,
while other prominent insurance executives and attorneys just as vigorously assert that the intent of Congress as expressed in Public Law 15
will be fully satisfied by the adoption of state legislation setting up
merely a standard or rule as a guide for regulation.
Another important item of discussion involved the matter of
cooperative action on various subjects by and between insurance companies as, for example, in the compilation of statistics and in the adoption of rates and rating plans. Under the Federal Anti-Trust Laws, any
agreement between two or more persons to fix prices constituted a
violation per se of the Federal Laws. Thus, the desire of the states to
avoid involvement of their insurance companies with Federal laws and
to permit beneficial cooperation and collective action in certain fields
between insurers, made legislation dealing with rate regulation and
rating plans one of the first items of business in all of the states. State
legislation, constituting "regulation" under Public Law 15 and under
Parker v. Brown,49 could grant immunity to collaborating insurance
companies from the restraints of the Sherman, Clayton and Federal
Trade Commission Acts in rate matters and as to other activities.
47Supra, note 44.
48 State v. Guertin, 89 N.H. 126, 193 A. 237 (1937) ; Great Northern Utilities Co.
v. Public Serv. Corn., 88 Mont. 180, 293 P. 294 (1930); Higgins v. Mitchell
Co. Commrs., 6 Kan. App. 314, 51 P. 72 (1897); In re Fleming, 117 Misc.
373, 191 N.Y.S. 586. (1921) ; 36 WORDS AND PHRAsEs 714 et seq.
49317 U.S. 341, 63 S.Ct. 307, 87 L.Ed. 315 (1943).
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2.

RATE REGULATION LAWS

After the passage of Public Law 15, the states gave immediate
attention to the adoption of appropriate insurance rate legislation. One
of the main subcommittees of the insurance All-Industry Committee
was a conference committee chosen to collaborate with a subcommittee
of the Committee on Rates and Rating Organizations of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners. These two groups spent a
tremendous amount of time and did a herculean job in promulgating
two drafts of rating laws-one a casualty and surety rate regulatory bill,
and the other a fire, marine and inland marine rate regulatory bill. These
so-called "model" bills were among the most carefully considered drafts
of proposed legislation ever agreed upon by any group representing all
segments of the industry involved.
The result was that most of the present state insurance rate regulation laws are based upon the Insurance Commissioners'-All Industry
"modeF' bills, although in some states the rating laws adopted contain
modifications of the "model" bills. In general, the legislation based on
the "model" bills in broad outline, provides that: (1) The rates must
conform to certain standards; that is, the rates cannot be excessive,
inadequate or unfairly discriminatory; (2) The rates must be filed with
the Insurance Commissioner who is directed to review such filings within a certain period of time (usually about fifteen days) before such rates
become effective. The Commissioner, under such laws, is given certain
powers to take action if the rates fail to meet the standards provided;
(3) The insurance companies may combine in rating matters if their
rating organizations are licensed and supervised by the state, but there
is no requirement that the companies must combine in rating matters.
In some states there is no mandatory requirement for the review of
rates before they become effective.
Today, rate regulatory laws are in effect in all 48 states, the District
of Columbia, Alaska and Puerto Rico.50 The insurance rating legislation
50

(a) Fire and Marine: Ala., Act 132 (1945), am'd. Act 125 (1947); Alaska,
ch. 58 (1947) (combined with casualty and surety bill) ; Ariz., ch. 126 (1947) ;
Ark., Act 50 (1947), Apa. INs. LAws (1950) §§ 201-203; Cal., ch. 805 (1947)
(combined with casualty and surety bill), CAL. STATS. (1951), ch. 1123; Colo.,
ch. 217 (1947), INS. CoDE (1950), 1951 Suppl., § 288a; Conn., Act 136 (1945),
superceded by.Act 163 (1947); Del., ch. 161 (1947) (combined with casualty
and surety bill); D.C., P.L. 327 (1944) (fire and windstorm), P.L. 541 (1948)
(casualty and surety, inland marine, explosion); Fla., chs. 23950, 24067
(1947) ; Ga., Act 366 (1947) ; Hawaii, Act 61 (1947) ; Idaho, ch. 246 (1947) ;
Ill., H-411 (1947); Ind., ch. 111 (1947); Iowa, ch. 260 (1947); Kan., ch. 278
(1947); Ky., H-400 (1948); La., Act 195 (ch. 30) (1948) (Combined with
casualty and surety bill); Me., ch. 275 (1945); Md., ch. 927 (1947); MAss.
ANNO. STATS. (1950), ch. 174-A; Mich., Act 100 (1947); Minn., ch. 120
(1947); Miss., ch. 188, L. 1924, ch 356 (1946), am'd. S-190 (1948) (combined
with casualty and surety bill); Mo. R. S. (1939), §§ 5971-5988; Mont., ch.
255 (1947); Nm. INS. LAws (1951), §§ 44-1443 to 44-1486; Nev., ch. 100
(1947) (combined with casualty and surety bill); N.H., ch. 261 (1947), as

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35

enacted by many states has been in the form of two separate rating
laws, one covering casualty and surety rate regulatory laws, and the
other covering fire, marine and inland marine rate regulatory laws.
In some states, however, a combined casualty, surety, fire, marine and
-inland marine law has been adopted.
In Wisconsin, for example, where the model bills for fire, marine
and inland marine, and for casualty and surety insurance were adopted,
the purpose section of both rating laws is practically identical. Section
203.32, Wis. Stats. (1949), relating to the purpose of the fire, marine
and inland marine insurance rating sections reads as follows:
"The purpose of this section is to promote the public welfare
by regulating insurance rates to the end that they shall not be
excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, and to authorize
and to regulate cooperative action among insurers in rate making
and in other matters within the scope of this section. Nothing in
this section is intended (1) to prohibit or discourage competition,
am'd. 1949 (combined with casualty and surety bill) ; N.J., ch. 27 (1944), am'd.
ch. 360 (1947); N. Mex., cl. 128 (1947); N.Y. ch. 618 (1948) (combined
with casualty and surety bill); N. Car., ch. 380 (1945) (combined with

casualty and surety bill); N.D., ch. 320 (1947) ; Ohio, S-144 (1947) ; Okla.,

cl. 174 (1915); Ore., ch. 337 (1947); Pa., PURDON's ANNO. STATS. (1950),
vol. 40, § 1224; Puerto Rico, Act 218 (1948) (combined with casualty and
surety bill) ; R.I., ch. 2088 (1947) ; S. Car., Act 398 (1947); S.D., ch. 142
(1947); Tenn., ch. 104 (1945); Tex., ch. 10 (1913), am'd. ch. 161 (1945);
Utah, ch. 63 (1947) (combined with casualty and surety bill); Vt., Act 173
(1947) (combined with casualty and surety bill); Va., ch. 268, 402 (1948);
Wash., ch. 79 (1947) (combined with casualty and surety bill); W. VA. CODE
(1943) §§ 3370-3381 (fire), ch. 105 (1947) (marine); Wis STATs. (1951),
§ 203.32; WYo. INS. LAWS (1949), § 29. (b) Casualty and Surety: Ala., Act
133 (1945) §§217-219; Alaska, ch. 58 (1947) (combined with fire and marine
bill); Ariz., ch. 127 (1947); Ark., Act 116 (1947), ARK. INS. LAWS (1950),
§§ 217-219; Cal., ch. 805 (1947) (combined with fire and marine bill), CAT.
STATS. (1951), ch. 1123; Colo., ch. 215 (1947), INS. CODE (1950), 1951 Suppl.,
§304; Conn., Act 133 (1945), superceded by Act 160, (1947); Del., ch. 161
(1947) (combined with fire and marine bill); D.C., P.L. 541 (1948) (includes
marine) ; Fla., ch. 22637, (1945), am'd. chs. 23950 and 24071 (1947); Ga., Act
365 (1947) ; Ill., H-410 (1947); Ind., ch. 60 (1947), IND. STATS., §§ 39-3006 to
3045, m'd. ch. 75 (1947) (workmen's compensation); Iowa, ch. 259 (1947);
Kan., ch. 215 (1945) ; Ky., ch. 100 (1946), superceded by ch. 106 (1948) ; La.,
Act 195 (ch. 30) (1948) (combined with first and marine bill); Me., ch. 274,
(1947) ; Md., ch. 926 (1945) ; MASS. ANNO. STATS. (1950), ch. 175A; Mich.,
Act 99 (1947) ; Minn., ch. 119 (1947) ; Miss., ch. 356 (1946), am'd. S-190
(combined with fire and marine), S-392 (1948); Mo., S-144 (1948); Mont.,
ch. 255 (1947)

(combined with fire and marine); NEB. INS. LAWS (1951),

§§ 44-1401 to 44-1442; Nev., ch. 100 (1947) (combined with fire and marine
bill); N.H., chs. 184, 235, 261 (1947) (combined with first and marine bill),
as am'd. 1949; N. Mex., ch. 155 (1937); N.Y., ch. 618 (1948) (combined
with fire and marine bill); N. Car., G.S. (1943), chs. 58, 97, ch. 380 (1945)
,combined with fire and marine bill); N.D., ch. 214 (1947); Ohio, H410
(1947) ; Ore., ch. 338 (1947); Penn., PURDON's ANNO. STATS. (1950), vol. 40,
§1184; Puerto Rico, Act 218 (1948) (combined with fire and marine bill);
RI., ch. 2089 (1948); S.Car., Act., Act 398 (1947); S.D., ch. 137 (1945),
superceded by ch. 143 (1947) ; Tenn., ch. 142 (1945); Tex., ch. 160 (1945) ;
Utah, ch. 63 (1947) (combined with fire and marine bill) ; Vt., ch. 281, P.L.
(1933), am'd. Act 162 (1945), Act 173 (1947) (combined with fire and
with fire and marine bill) ; Va., chs. 248 and 401 (1948) ;Wash., ch. 79 (1947) ;
Wis. STATS. (1951), §§ 204.37, 204.55; Wyo. INS. LAWS (1949), §§ 191-208.
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or to prohibit, or encourage, except to the extent necessary to
accomplish the aforementioned purpose, uniformity in insurance
rates, rating systems, rating plans or practices. This section shall
be liberally interpreted to carry into effect the provisions of this
subsection ..."

Section 204.37 of the 1949 Statutes, relating to casualty insurance,
is in substance, the same as to purpose as Sec. 203.32 relating to fire,
marine and inland marine insurance.
In California, Idaho, Montana and Missouri, no casualty rates are
filed, but the Insurance Commissioner has authority later to investigate
to see whether the rates measure up to the standards fixed by law. In
the states of Texas and Louisiana the casualty rates are promulgated by
the state. In Massachusetts where the compulsory automobile liability
law is in effect, the state likewise fixes the casualty rates. In the District
of Columbia, casualty rate filings are required and the Commissioner
has power to investigate the rates filed to see whether they comply with
the law.
In addition to the technical requirements of the various insurance
rating laws, the companies are faced with the problem of strict or liberal
interpretation of the state regulatory rating statutes. In jurisdictions
where filings are required and where the Commissioner enforces a
strict interpretation of the rating laws, the companies are required to
justify rate filings by detailed statistical compilations. This requirement
has caused many protests to be filed by companies who complain that
the compilation of statistics is costly and that they also have difficulty
in obtaining the data needed to comply with some of the Insurance
Departments' demands. Some insurers feel that too much emphasis is
being placed upon statistics which, in many cases, become obsolete
before they become available.
In states where filings of casualty insurance rates are required, the
companies may do one of three things: (1) File their rates independently; (2) Become a member or a subscriber of a rating bureau, or (3)
Become a member of a rating bureau but deviate from the bureau rates
where this is permitted.-5a Each company must decide for itself which
method of filing it seems most advantageous for its particular operations.
In states where the so-called subsequent disapproval statutes are in
force, the insurers, as a practical matter, usually do not put new rates
into force until after the Department has approved the rates, for the
reason that the insurers do not wish to promulgate a new rate, distribute
50a In the first known decision of its kind, the Circuit Court for Sangamon
County, Ill., upheld the action of Illinois Insurance Director Day in authorizing two large fire insurance companies to deviate from the uniform rates
fixed by the dating bureau of which the companies were members, and to
charge lower rates in Cook County, Ill. [See 166 WEEIMY UNDERWMTER, p.
437 (No. 7, Feb. 16, 1952)].
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this information to agents' or brokers' offices and then find that the
Department has decided the rate is wrong and can't be used. The usual
procedure is for the company to submit all rates in advance in order to
protect themselves. So, most subsequent disapproval rating laws for
practical reasons operate as prior approval laws.
The conclusion to be drawn from the practical workings of the
various state insurance rating laws is that, despite some grumblings,
misgivings and criticisms, the states have done a good job of meeting a
difficult situation. This has been accomplished through fine cooperation
between the insurance industry and the Insurance Departments.
Naturally, some companies would prefer little or no regulation of rates,
but since rate regulation is required and appears to be in the public
interest, the companies for the most part have reconciled themselves to
this situation. The future efforts of the insurers and the administrative
authorities will, no doubt, be aimed toward improving any weakness or
inadequacies in the present rating laws to the end that the public interest
may be best served, competition preserved, with the companies given a
maximum amount of freedom in their operations, including rate making
and in the adoption and use of new and perhaps unorthodox methods
of doing business.
3.

UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES ACTS

Twenty-six statesPl now have enacted so-called unfair trade practices
acts applying to the business of insurance. The usual statutes of this
type prohibits certain enumerated unfair acts and business practices,
such as false advertising, defamation of competitors, rebates, false
financial statements, unfair discrimination and the like.
4. CLAYTON TYPE ANTI-TRUST LAws

RELATING TO

INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATES

Some states have enatced laws to regulate the problems arising from
interlocking controls which are prohibited by the Federal Clayton Act.
51

2

ARK. INs. LAWS (1950), §§ 189-198; COLO. INS. CODE (1950), §§ 339-347; FLA.
INS. LAWS (1951), ch. 643; Ga. Gen'l. Act 748 (Senate bill 125 1950 Leg.
Sess.) ; IND. STATS. (1947), ch. 112; IND. INS. LAWS (1950), § 39-5301 et seq.;
Ky. INs. LAWS (1950), §§ 304.924-304.945; LA. INS. CODE (1950), §§ 1211-1217;
MAINE INS. LAWS (1949), ch. 319, as amended; MD. STATs. (1947), ch. 757;
MASS. ANNO. STATS. (1950), ch. 176-D; Mich., Act 230 (1947), MICH. INS. CODE
(1951), §§ 547A.1-547A.15; MINN. STATS. (1947), ch. 129; NEB. INS. LAWS
(1951), § 44-1501 et. seq.; NEV. GEN. INs. LAWS (1950), §§ 49A-491, as
amended; N.H. INS. LAWS (1948), ch. 333-A; N.J. STATS. (1947), ch. 379;
N. MEx. INS. LAWS (1951), §§ 60-712 to 60-722; N.Y. STATS. (1948), ch. 501,
N.Y. INS. LAWS (1950), §§ 270-282; N. CAR. INS. LAWS (1947) (as amended
1949), ch. 58, art. 3-A, §§ 58-54.1 to 58-54.13; PA. PURDON's ANNO. STATS.
(1950), vol. 40, § 1153 et seq.; S. CAP., Act 398 (1947) ; S.D. STATS. (1947),
ch. 144; TENN. STATS. (1947), ch. 202; UTAH STATS. (1947), ch. 63; WASH.
INS. CODE (1947), art. 30; Wis. STATS. (1951), § 207.01 et seq.
52 CAL INS. CODE (1950), § 125; CONN. Gm.
STATS. (1949), § 6094; ILL. Rv.
STATS. (1951), ch. 73, § 767.1; IND. INS. LAWS (1950), § 39-3727; MASS. ANNo.
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These state laws usually provide that interlocking directorates, and
purchases of other company stock, are authorized unless competition in
the business of insurance would be lessened substantially, or a monopoly
created therein. The Insurance Commissioner is usually given power,
after notice and hearing, and where the Commissioner finds a violation
of this Act, to issue a cease and desist order which is subject to
judicial review.
The purpose of the various Clayton type state laws relating to
interlocking directorates involving insurance companies is well expressed
in section 6094, Connecticut General Statutes of 1949 which reads as
follows:
"Any person may be a director in two or more insurance
corporations when such interlocking directorate is not used as a
means of substantially lessening competition or tending to
create a monopoly."

5. ROBINSON-PATMAN TYPE LAWS
In some states5 3 legislation in the form of Robinson-Patman type
laws was adopted. These statutes were considered necessary to make
certain that the payment of commissions to brokers was permitted. The
purpose of this type of statute is to meet any possible application to the
business of insurance of the Federal Robinson-Patman Act which prohibits payment of commissions to the agents of the buyer, as well as
prohibiting discrimination in commodity transactions.
6. AcCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE LEGISLATION
Most states now have legislation requiring the filing of accident and
health policy forms. In general the states do not regulate the rates to be
charged for accident and health insurance. There are exceptions,
however. The newer accident and health insurance regulation laws
which have been adopted during the last five years have followed the
provisions of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners-All
Industry "model" bill. Under legislation of this type, the Commissioner
usually has power, after notice and hearing, to disapprove any form
containing inequitable or deceptive provisions. A form may also be
STATS. (1950), Suppl. ch. 175, § 193C; MH .Laws (1949), ch. 333-A, § 16a;
N.J. STATS. ANNO. (1951), Title 17, ch. 17A, § 2; N.Y. INS. LAWS (1950),
§ 67; PA. PuRDoN's ANNO. STATS. (1950), vol. 40, § 459.2; WASH. INS. CODE
(1949), § 30.25. Section 67 of the NEW YORK INSURANcE LAW, as amended
in 1950, is an excellent example of a statute designed to solve in a realistic
and practical way the difficult problem of the regulation of stock ownership,

interlocking directors and common management in the insurance field. How-

ever, doubts have been expressed by some attorneys concerning the legality

53 of such statutes.

MASS. ANNO. STATS. (1950), Suppl. ch. 175, sec. 168; N.H. REv. LAWS (1947),
ch. 325, § 36; PA. PuRON's ANNO. STATS. (1950), vol. 40, §256; see also
CONN. GEN. STATS. (1951 Supp.), § 1186b.
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disapproved which provides for benefits unreasonable in relation to the
premium charged. The states on the whole seem to be in no hurry to
adopt comprehensive or detailed rate regulatory laws governing the
accident and health insurance business.
Section 164, New York Insurance Law, as enacted by Ch. 630, Laws
of 1951, provides in part that no policy of accident and sickness insurance shall be issued except as provided in subsection six "until the
rate manual showing rates, rules and classifications of risks for use in
connection with such forms of policies . . . has been filed with the

Superintendent." The Massachusetts statutes54 contain provisions that
are typical of the state laws which require merely approval of accident
and health insurance policies but with no power granted to the Insurance
Commissioner to approve or disapprove rates.
New Hampshire has a statute typical of those requiring the filing of
rates governing the accident and health insurance business. Under
Chapter 162, New Hampshire Laws of 1947, accident and health
insurance policies and rates must be filed with the State Insurance
Commissioner.
In some states the accident and sickness law is made optional for a
time and mandatory after a certain date. Michigan, for example,
adopted a "new set of standard provisions applicable to accident and
sickness policies." Their use by insurers is optional until January 1,
4
1956, and upon that date is made mandatory. a
In Pennsylvania the insurance rate regulation Act applies to "all
classes and kinds of insurance which may be written by stock or mutual
casualty companies... in this Commonwealth except:... (b) accident
and health insurance." Title 40, Section 1182, Purdon's Anno. Stats.
1950, Penn.
7.

REGULATION OF UNAUTHORIZED

INSURERS

The activities of unlicensed insurers have long troubled the various
state Insurance Departments and other administrative agencies. The
bad practices of some unauthorized mail order insurers resulted in
widespread demand for regulation of this class of insurers. The Federal
Trade Commission, taking cognizance of this situation, recently promulgated rules for mail order insurers. Many states have sought to control
the activities of unlicensed foreign insurers by some form of legislation. Many of them have adopted so-called model Insurance Commissioners' Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Process Acts.5 These laws
54

MASS. ANNO. STATS. (1950), Suppl. ch. 175, §§ 108-110.
MICH. INS. CODE (1951 Supp.), §§ 548.101-548.107.
55 CAL. INS. CODE (1950), §§ 1619-1620; CONN. GEN. STATS. (1951 Supp.), §
1187b; FLA. INS. LAWS (1951), § 625.30; Ga. Ins. Laws (1950) 759 (House
bill 1041) ; ILL. REv. STATS. (1951), ch. 73, sec. 735; Iowa Acts (1947), ch.
212; KAN. GEN. STATS. (1949), ch. 40, §§ 2001-2006; MAINE INS. LAws (1951),
54a
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declare that the doing of certain acts by the unlicensed foreign insurer,
such as issuance or delivery of contracts to residents of the state, the
solicitation of applications for contracts, the collection of premiums, or
any other transaction of business, shall constitute an appointment by the
insurer of the Insurance Commissioner as its agent for services of
process.
The United States Supreme Court upheld this type of service of
process statute in the case of Travelers Health Ass'n. v. Virginia.8
Some states prohibit, under penalty, any person from acting for, or
aiding in the procuring of a policy of insurance in an unlicensed
insurer.51 Other states seek to tax premiums received in the state by
unlicensed insurers,58 and some states have enacted so-called "Reciprocal
State" laws prohibiting a domestic insurer from insuring in another state
having a similar law unless such domestic insurer is licensed in the other
state.59 In Iowa no action may be maintained upon any policy of fire
insurance issued upon property in Iowa by an unauthorized company,
unless within six months after the issuance of the policy there has been
paid into the state treasury 2 per cent of the gross premium. 6 0 Some

jurisdictions permit the solicitation and placement of insurance in an
unauthorized company only if such insurance cannot be obtained from
the majority of the licensed companies and insurance is not placed for
purpose of procuring a lower rate than the lowest of an authorized
insurer.6 '
E. MULTIPLE LINE INSURANCE RATING ORGANIZATION
At the 82d Annual Meeting of the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners held at Swampscott, Massachusetts in June 1951, a
newly formed voluntary Multiple Peril Insurance Rating Organization
was approved. This organization was formed to collect necessary
experience and develop suitable plans and procedures for contracts involving combinations of coverages under the multiple line laws. Many
§§ 13A-13E; MD. INs. LAWS (1949), §§ 273-277; Mass. Acts (1950), ch. 781;
ANNO. LAWS OF MASS. (1950 Supp. to vol. 5A), ch. 175B; MicH. INS. CODE

(1950), § 513.14; NEB. INS. LAws (1951), §§ 44-137.01 to 44-137.10; N.H.
INS. LAWS (1949), ch. 325A; N. MEX. INS. LAws (1951), ch. 172; N.Y.
INS. LAWS (1950), § 59a;' PuRDoN's PA. ANNO STATS. (1950), vol. 40,
§§ 1005.01 et seq.; TEX. INS, CODE (1951), p. 241, art. 21.38.
56339 U.S. 643, 70 S.Ct. 927, 94 L.Ed. 1154 (1950), affirming 188 Va. 877, 51
S.E. (2d) 263 (1949). See annotation on jurisdiction over non-resident individuals and foreign corporations in 94 L.Ed. 1167 (1950); see also Ga.
Laws (1950), 759.
57 Conn. Ins. Laws (1949), § 6058; Del. Ins. Laws (1949), 536, § 75.
58WIs. STATS. (1949), § 76.33; PA. INS. LAWs Comp. (1947), p. 164; ALA. INS.
CODE (1940), title 28, § 76; D.C. INs. CODE (1940), title 35, § 1344.
5 See CA. INS. CODE, § 706.7. Other states having such laws include Arkansas,
Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Hampshire,
Oregon, South Dakota, Virginia, Washington, and the territories of Hawaii
6 and Puerto Rico.
0 IOWA CODE ANNO., § 515.137.
61
HAWAII INS. LAWS, § 8511 R/L (1945), amended S/L (1949), Act. 369.
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multiple peril insurance policies are now being written at a single rate
and for a single indivisible premium. In the absence of a rating bureau
equipped to make rates for the combinations of coverages it has been
necessary for underwriters to make their own rates and rating plans.
This new organization hopes to develop a statistical plan for each form
of coverage including the new coverages that protect the property of a
single owner located in several states.
CONCLUSION
A study of the court decisions, of the insurance legislation adopted
by the states, and the actual administration of the state insurance laws
by the state Insurance Departments during the past eight years emphasizes the determination of the states to "regulate" insurance through
legislation and effective administration of the laws in such a way that
the intent of Congress, as expressed in the Federal Anti-Trust Laws and
especially in Public Law 15, will be fully carried out. It may be suggested that Public Law 15 is the keystone of the present day structure
of state regulation of the business of insurance. Congress has, of course,
the power at any session to change any or all of the federal laws, including Public Law 15. However, it is clear that so long as the states
continue to make a bona-fide, sincere and effective effort to "regulate"
insurance in the public interest by encouraging open competition between insurers, by only regulating the rates wherever necessary, by
prohibiting discrimination and the like, Congress will not take away
from the states the right of regulation and, for that matter, neither will
Congress impose on the insurance industry complete federal regulation.
The end result of the S.E.U.A. decision, which led to the enactment
of Public Law 15, has been a "flood of ... legislation" with quite a bit
of litigation, though not more than would be expected. The legislation
adopted has resulted in the complete overhauling and amending of most
state insurance laws. All of the state laws on this subject have been
motivated by the desire to conform to the wishes of Congress to preserve
competition and to protect the public interest. The courts, both federal
and state, in deciding cases involving state regulation of insurance, too,
have kept in mind the public interest and the intent of Congress as
expressed in Public Law 15 regarding the continued regulation of
insurance by the states. During the past eight years the courts have
upheld state regulatory laws and the regulation and taxation by the
states of the business of insurance. The insurance industry, on the
whole, has gone along with the regulation programs proposed by the
states. The insurers feel that, despite all of the worrys, the work, the
uncertainty and the extra regulation imposed upon the industry during
the last eight years, the business of insurance is in a more sound
position than ever before and that it will so continue. The fact that

INSURANCE REGULATION

insurance is now commerce and, if conducted across state lines is
interstate commerce, and hence may be subject to federal and state
regulatory laws, will not hamper the business of insurance in fulfilling
its destiny as a great constructive force in our American economy by
aiding the average individual to attain economic freedom and security.
The writer must close this paper with one word of caution. Though
the litigation since S.E.U.A., involving questions of federal and state
regulation of insurance, has not been as heavy as had been expected,
some questions regarding the division of federal and state control of the
business of insurance remain unanswered. There is still a possibility
that the late Chief Justice Stone's famous prediction in the S.E.U.A.
case may yet come true and "a flood of litigation" may still engulf the
insurance industry before we establish the true boundaries between
state and national power over the business of insurance.
One of the surest ways to bring about a demand on the part of the
insurance industry for greater federal control would be for the states
to overstep the bounds of reasonable regulation. The writer is of the
opinion that to date the states have exercised commendable restraint in
wielding their recently reaffirmed powers of regulation. It is to be hoped
that the fine cooperation now existing between the insurance industry
and the state insurance departments will continue, to the end that state
62
control of insurance will never be superseded by federal control.

62 Despite the unprecedented number of insurance laws that have been enacted

by the various states since S.E.U.A., there can be no question but that many
more state laws relating to the regulation of insurance will be adopted in the
near future. At the National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Convention for Zone 5, held at Dallas, Texas, March 20-22, 1952, some 34 items
affecting the regulation of insurance were considered, (some of which may
soon be enacted into law). At the various meetings held this year to celebrate
the 200th anniversary of mutual insurance, questions of regulation were discussed. Among the problems which are currently debated are the following:

Should the rates for Accident and Health policies be subject to scrutiny under
legal enactments? Should merit rating plans for automobile insurance be
permitted by statute? In analyzing rates for possible increase or reduction,
should investment profit be taken into consideration? Should the state be
zoned for hail rates instead of using county or township experience indi-

vidually? What consideration should be given to experience and schedule
rating plans for casualty? To what extent should trend factors be used in
rate revising? What safeguards should be employed in the use of trend

factors in rate revisions? Should statutes be adopted to permit the use of
multiple line policies covering various risks of a single individual or corporation
or groups in different states?
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